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Our estimates, based on large firm-level and industry-level data sets from eighteen countries, 
suggest that FDI and trade have strong positive spillover effects on product and technology 
innovation by domestic firms in emerging markets. The FDI effect is more pronounced for firms 
from advanced economies.  Moreover, our results indicate that the spillover effects can be detected 
with micro data at the firm-level, but that using linkage variables computed from input-output tables 
at the industry level yields much weaker, and usually insignificant, estimated effects. These patterns 
are consistent with spillover effects being rather proximate and localized. 
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A major question that has arisen in the last few decades is whether domestic firms have become 
stronger or weaker with the opening up of most economies to foreign trade and investment. More 
specifically, has the efficiency of firms in emerging market economies improved with the growing 
presence of foreign direct investment (FDI) within their borders and the opening of these economies 
to trade? While there is substantial evidence that multinational enterprises (MNEs)0F 1  are more 
productive than domestic firms,1F2 the evidence on productivity spillovers of FDI and trade remains 
mixed.2F3  
 The mixed evidence points to the need to understand better the mechanisms through which 
horizontal and vertical relationships with foreign firms and international trade improve or hamper 
efficiency of domestic firms. Innovation is the presumed conduit through which globalization affects 
productivity, yet there has been little research testing the relationship between globalization and 
innovation. In this paper, we provide the first analysis based on industry-level (“indirect”) and firm-
level (“direct”) data to address this question. 
Foreign firms may have efficiency and other “spillover” effects on local competitors 
(horizontal spillovers) as well as on upstream and downstream domestic firms (vertical spillovers).3F4 
                                                 
1 In this paper the term MNEs refers to foreign-owned firms, although we recognize that domestically owned firms can also 
be multinational in their production and sourcing. 
2 See e.g., the seminal work of Caves (1974) and the more recent work of Djankov and Hoekman (2000), Haskel, Pereira 
and Slaughter (2007) and Sabirianova, Svejnar and Terrell (2005). 
3 Various literatures examine the impact of globalization on efficiency of firms in emerging markets. For a review of the 
literature on foreign direct investment, see e.g., Gorg and Greenaway (2004); for a review of the trade literature, see e.g., 
Wagner (2007). 
4 The spillover (broadly defined as a transfer of managerial practices, production methods, marketing techniques or any 
other knowledge embodied in a product or service) may occur through a number of channels.  Local firms may for 
instance learn to imitate a new process or improve the quality of their products or services through observation, or find 
out about better processes or marketing methods through interaction with foreign managers in business chambers and 
from former employees of MNEs. Local firms may also benefit from the entry of new professional services or suppliers 
as a result of the MNE entry. Foreign firms may act as catalysts for domestic suppliers to improve quality or time 
efficiency by demanding higher standards. On the other hand, foreign firms may have a negative effect on domestic 
firms’ output and efficiency if they “steal” their market or best human capital.  If domestic firms cut back production in 
the face of foreign competition, they may experience a higher average cost as fixed costs are spread over a smaller scale 
of production (Aitken and Harrison, 1999).  Similarly, if the best employees leave for foreign firms, efficiency declines. 
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Most studies examine “horizontal spillovers” and do so at the industry level within a production 
function framework. 4F5 The effect of foreign presence on the productivity of domestic firms in a given 
industry is captured by the coefficient on the share of foreign firms’ output or employment in that 
industry.  The evidence from this research is mixed.  Most studies of developing countries suggest 
that the horizontal spillover effect is nil or negative.5F6  On the other hand, several studies find positive 
horizontal spillovers in the more developed economies such as the UK.6F7  Hence, there is a puzzle 
that is of considerable interest. 
While studies of horizontal productivity spillovers are numerous, until recently there were 
few empirical studies on vertical spillovers. This is surprising given the early analysis by Lall 
(1980) of the positive backward linkage effects of foreign firms on the Indian trucking industry.7F8  
Moreover, vertical spillovers are more likely to be positive than horizontal spillovers since MNEs 
have an incentive to improve the productivity of their suppliers rather than that of their 
competitors.8F9  The empirical papers that have appeared recently do indeed find evidence that is 
consistent with the view of technology transfer through backward linkages in the manufacturing 
sectors of for example, Hungary (Schoors and van der Tol, 2001), Indonesia (Blalock and Gertler, 
2005), Lithuania (Javorcik, 2004), Czech Republic (Stancik, 2007)  and the United Kingdom 
                                                 
5 The literature on FDI spillovers has been burgeoning in recent years. We do not attempt to summarize the large and rapidly 
growing literature, but simply highlight the work that has motivated the analysis in this paper.  We refer the interested 
reader to a survey by Gorg and Greenaway (2004). 
6 See for example studies of Morocco by Haddad and Harrison (1993); Venezuela by Aitken and Harrison (1999); Bulgaria 
and Romania by Konings (2000); Russia by Yudaeva et al. (2003); the Czech Republic by Kosova (2004); and China by 
Abraham, Konings and Slootmaekers (2006). In the Chinese case, Abraham, Konings and Slootmaekers (2006) find positive 
horizontal spillovers for certain types of firms. Recently, using firm-level data from ten transition economies, Damijan et 
al. (2012) find that horizontal spillovers tend to be positive in more productive firms and negative in less productive and 
smaller ones. 
7 See e.g., Haskel et al. (2007) and Keller and Yeaple (2003). 
8 On the other hand, there are numerous case studies which provide specific examples of how MNEs provide training and 
assistance to their suppliers.  See for example, Moran (2001). 
9Blalock and Gertler (2005) point out that MNEs may establish a relationship with multiple suppliers to reduce dependency 
on a single supplier and that this will then benefit all firms that purchase these vendors’ output. Consistent with this view, 
Lin and Saggi (2005) show theoretically how exclusivity in the contractual relationship between a multinational and its 
local supplier reduces the competition among local suppliers and can lower backward linkages and local welfare relative to 
autarky.  
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(Girma, Gorg and Pisu, 2007). However, these studies rely only on a variable that is constructed 
from input-output (I-O) tables at the industry level, rather than a direct firm-specific measure. 
More recently, Gorodnichenko, Svejnar and Terrell (2010) use firm-specific linkage variables to 
examine the productivity effects of the share of sales to multinationals, share of exports in total 
sales and share of imported inputs in total input cost in the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Surveys (BEEPS) data. Moreover, Vacek (2007) uses a firm-specific linkage variable 
to examine the productivity effects of share of sales to multinationals within a small sample of 
large firms in four two-digit NACE manufacturing sectors in the Czech Republic. Finally, Barrioso 
et al. (2011) find evidence of positive backward linkages using plant level data from Ireland.  
There has thus been considerable advancement within the productivity spillover literature, but 
the mixed results suggest that one needs to (a) examine directly the effect of FDI and trade on 
innovation and (b) assess whether the widely used industry-level linkage measures (e.g., Javorcik, 
2004) provide an adequate approach or whether it is preferable to employ firm-level linkage 
measures in addressing these issues. The direct examination of the effect of FDI and trade on 
innovation is desirable because theories usually make predictions about the effects on innovation by 
firms rather than about the (derived) productivity effect. Furthermore, as argued by Gorodnichenko 
(2008) and others, measured productivity captures the revenue generating ability of firms (which 
includes both market power and technology level) rather than the technology level of firms.  The 
comparison of the indirect effects based on (aggregate) industry-level linkages and direct effect 
based on firm-level (micro) linkages is highly desirable because it is not clear that the typical 
measures of vertical linkages at the industry level, which rely on I-O tables (e.g., Javorcik, 2004) 
provide a sufficiently precise measure of the linkage. 
In this paper we carry out this analysis by combining the rich ORBIS™ data base of firms 
with the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS of firms in 18 emerging market (transition) economies and Turkey. 
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We use these with industry-level input-output data that we have collected individually from national 
statistical offices and international organizations. The combined data set enables us to provide the 
first study of innovation effects of both industry-level (input-output) and firm-level (micro) 
measures of horizontal, backward and forward linkages of local firms to MNEs. As mentioned 
earlier, we also include in the analysis of vertical spillovers the concept of selling to or buying from 
firms outside of the country, i.e., importing and exporting, since vertical spillovers need not be 
constrained to linkages with foreign firms within the host country alone. In doing so, we recognize 
that others have analyzed the link between firm-level innovation and imports or exports.9F10 The 
advantage of our approach derives from the fact that we analyze vertical linkages as sales to 
multinationals, as well as exports and imports, and that unlike other studies we carry out our analysis 
on many countries.  
Second, we are able to provide much larger comparative evidence on more heterogeneous 
firms than has been possible in this area to date.10F11  Our analysis covers firms in both the service and 
manufacturing sectors, while existing studies focus on manufacturing. This is important because 
most of the recent FDI is in services.  We are also able to estimate the effects separately for small 
firms, while much of the existing evidence is for medium and large firms. Being able to cover 
smaller firms is important because smaller firms tend to be the new entrepreneurs and engines of 
growth in many emerging market economies. Finally, we also test for differences in spillovers 
                                                 
10 These include Bustos (2011), who uses a theoretical model and evidence from Argentine firm-level data to show that 
firms update technology when faced with the opportunities presented by trade liberalization. Long, Raff and Stahler 
(2011) also use a theoretical model to show that trade liberalization increases firm-level innovation in a set-up with 
heterogeneous firms (although they describe innovation in terms of cost-saving R&D). Fernandes and Paunov (2010) use 
Chilean firm-level data to evidence product innovation or quality upgrades by firms faced with import competition. One 
other paper examines both directions of causality between innovation and exporting -- Damijan, Kostevc and Polanec 
(2010) use Slovenian firm-level data to show that exporting leads to productivity improvements, especially for firms that 
report changes to their production process. 
11 Our analysis includes firm level data from Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, and Ukraine.  
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among new and old firms – in our case firms that existed prior to 1990 (before the fall of the 
communist regime) and those that started afterwards.   
Third, we check the robustness of our base results using a control function approach and find 
that the base results are quite robust. 
We find that FDI and trade have strong positive spillover effects on innovation by domestic 
firms. Moreover, our results indicate that the spillover effects can be detected with micro data at the 
firm-level, but that using linkage variables computed from I-O tables at the industry level yields 
much weaker, and usually insignificant, estimated effects. Furthermore, whether we use input-
output matrices to calculate immediate linkages to industries with strong foreign present or to 
calculate total linkages across industries (based on the inverse of input-output matrices) appears to 
make relatively little difference for the estimates of the industry-level effects. Thus, the spillover 
effects on innovation appear to be localized rather than broad-based. However, the strength of 
estimates spillovers is heterogeneous. For example, spillovers of FDI from more advanced countries 
(OECD) are more tangible than spillovers of FDI from less advanced (non-OECD) countries 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our data and 
analytical methodology. In Section 3 we present our findings and we interpret them in the 
concluding Section 4.  
2. Data and Methodology 
 
As mentioned above, we use firm-level data from the ORBIS™ and BEEPS data bases.11F12 The 
BEEPs survey was first undertaken in 1999–2000, when it was administered to approximately 
4,000 enterprises in 26 countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Commonwealth of 
                                                 
12The description of the data draws heavily from Synovate (2005), the report from the firm that implemented the BEEPS 
instrument and provided the EBRD and World Bank with electronic data sets. 
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Independent States (CIS) to assess the environment for private enterprise and business 
development. The second and third rounds of the BEEPS were carried out in 2002 and 2005 on 
approximately 6,500 and 9,500 enterprises, respectively, in the same CIS and CEE countries, (but 
expanded to include Turkey from the second round and Turkmenistan from the third round). The 
2005 BEEPS survey instrument approximates the coverage, sampling frames and specific 
questionnaire items of the second round of the BEEPS.12F13  
 In this paper we use primarily the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS surveys as they contains data on 
the variables of interest.13F14  The original 2005 data base contains a total of 9,655 firms, with 200 – 
975 firms per country. The share of firms in services ranges from 50% to 65% across the 28 
countries. Between two-thirds and three-quarters of the firms have less than 50 employees.  
Approximately 10% of the firms are foreign owned and another 10% are state owned.  The share 
of firms that export more than 20% of their output varies widely across countries: from 5% in 
Kazakhstan to 30% in Slovenia. The 2002 BEEPS has a similar structure and composition.  
 We use information on foreign ownership from the ORBIS database – a global firm-level 
database constructed by Bureau van Dijk. 14F15 The ownership data include owner’s country of origin 
(not only whether a firm is foreign-owned), allowing us to identify whether or not foreign 
ownership is from an OECD economy.   
                                                 
13 See more detailed explanation of data set and questionnaires at 
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/analysis/surveys/beeps.shtml. 
 
14 The reference year for the 2005 BEEPS is actually 2004 and for the 2002 BEEPS it is 2001.  However, for ease of 
exposition, we simply refer to the year of the survey. 
15 http://www.bvdinfo.com/Products/Company-Information/International/ORBIS.aspx. Bureau van Dijk is also 
responsible for the AMADEUS database, which business and economics scholars have used for more than a decade for 
Europe-focused firm-level studies. ORBIS is the global superset of AMADEUS. It is arguably the world’s largest 
database of public and private companies, and it distinguishes itself by being the only global dataset that comprehensively 
identifies parent-subsidiary relationships between firms. (Bureau van Dijk aggregates ownership and financial 
information from official sources worldwide – primarily using sources like national registers of companies like the United 
Kingdom’s Company House, private information services like FAME™, credit analysts like D&B, and the public records 
of listed companies. By 2010, it covered more than 80 million firms from 180 countries and territories). ORBIS firm-level 
data coverage overlaps with all the years for which we have BEEPS data –its scope similarly extends to firms of all sizes 
and industry sectors. 
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In addition to the ORBIS™ and BEEPS data, we rely on data from I-O tables to construct 
the industry-wide spillover variables.  We are only able to obtain recent I-O tables for 18 of the 
economies covered by the survey, therefore we focus our analysis on these countries and we pool 
the 2002 and 2005 survey data.15F16  We take I-O tables from GTAP 7.16F17 
The sample includes a variety of firms, from very small firms with as few as two employees 
to larger firms with up to 10,000 employees.  Moreover, the data include firms in the rural areas 
as well as large cities, and firms in industry as well as firms in the service sector, which is the new 
dynamic (yet understudied) sector in these economies.17F18  Hence the data enable us to analyze 
diverse firms in a large number of countries.  
In addition, the data set contains a panel component, where several hundred firms that were 
surveyed in 2002 were surveyed again in 2005.18F19 However, our analysis relies primarily on the 
pooled 2002 and 2005 data since many variables of interest have a retrospective component in 
each survey date and because it is hard to detect robust relationships with a small panel of 
heterogeneous firms, especially when we use a number of  control variables. 
An important advantage of our data is that firms self-report various types of innovation 
activity.  Most studies on innovation use patent data or R&D expenditures, which are often 
regarded as potentially problematic. Patents are generally viewed as having three weaknesses: 1) 
they measure inventions rather than innovations; 2) the tendency to patent varies across countries, 
industries and processes; and 3) firms often protect their innovations by using methods other than 
                                                 
16 We have attempted to impute values for countries with missing input-output tables by using the average values from the 
two closest neighboring countries but we have found that such imputation introduced too much noise in the data. 
17 https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/ 
18 According to Fernandes (2009), “During the 1997-2004 period, services represent an increasing share of value-added 
… in the [Eastern European] region, averaging 46% … remarkable given the underdevelopment of the services sector … 
during the communist period”. 
19 The relatively small size of the panel should not be associated with intensive exit of firms in these countries.  The exit 
rate was about 8% (average across countries).  The size of the panel is mainly brought about by a refusal of firms to 
participate in the new wave of the survey (42%) and inability to reach eligible responders within firms (25%).  
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patents (maintaining technological complexity, industrial secrecy, and lead time over competitors). 
Using R&D expenditures may also be inappropriate because not all innovations are generated by 
R&D expenditures (Santamaria et al, 2008), R&D does not necessarily lead to innovation (it is an 
input rather than an output), and formal R&D measures are biased against small firms (Michie, 
1998; Archibugi and Sirilli, 2001; Lin et al, 2010). Perhaps most important for the purposes of this 
paper is the fact that in emerging market economies these types of innovations are less likely to be 
observed as firms are expected to engage more in imitation and adaptation of already created and 
tested technologies, rather than in generating new inventions and are less likely to expend 
resources on R&D. 
In this study, we define innovation broadly as the development and upgrading of new 
products and adoption of new technologies. Specifically, we use binary variables based on top 
managers’ answers to the question about whether a firm has undertaken any of the following two 
initiatives in the last three years:  Developed successfully a major new product line or upgraded 
an existing product line – hereafter New Product; acquired new production technology -- hereafter 
New Technology.  
As noted above, since we are studying emerging market economies, it is expected that these 
two measures of innovation may have some element of imitation or adoption rather than “in house 
development.”  We know for example, that the new technology used in the firm can be acquired 
in a number of ways.  It can be developed by the firm (17% who answered that they acquired a 
new technology said this was the way the technology was introduced) or it can be acquired by 
hiring new personnel (5%) or transferred from elsewhere (universities, business associations, etc., 
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3%).  However, the vast majority of acquired new technology was embodied in new machinery or 
equipment that was purchased or licensed from other sources (75%).19F20  
The BEEPS data also permit us to control at the firm level for the effects of pressure from 
foreign and domestic competition. In particular, we use as a control variable each firm’s markup, 
a “sufficient statistic” for the degree of competition.20F21 
In addition to providing competition, foreign firms may also transfer capabilities. The 
BEEPS data permit us to capture the extent of vertical linkages between domestic and foreign 
firms, which allow transfer of capabilities or “knowledge spillovers.” We use three variables for 
vertical linkages: SMNE, the share of a firm’s sales to multinational enterprises;21F22 Exports, the 
share of sales exported; and Imports, the share of inputs imported.  Whereas SMNE can be 
construed as capturing downstream relationships with foreign firms within the country, Exports 
can be viewed as capturing downstream relationships with foreign firms outside the country.  
The estimated specification is 
Φ   
  
  
	 , , ,   
 , log  
 ,  
	  , 
                                                 
20 One may be concerned that a vast majority of new technology is due to imitation and wonder whether our results extend 
to genuine in-house innovations made within firms. We applied our econometric specification (discussed below) to two in-
house measures of innovation – positive R&D expenditures and “new technology developed by the firm” -- and found very 
similar effects.   
21 Mayer et al. (2011) explore the use of markup as an indicator of competition and justify its use as a sufficient statistic.  
22 A multinational enterprise is defined as a firm with 50% or more foreign ownership. 
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where I is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm reported an innovation, and zero otherwise; 
Φ denotes the cumulative density function of a standard normal random variable; i, s, c, and t index 
firms, sector, country, and time, respectively. Variables dated with period 3 are taken from 
retrospective questions about the firm’s performance three years prior to the current date.  
The first three variables capture industry-level, foreign linkage variables: horizontal, 
backward and forward. These linkages are common across firms in a given industry, time, and 
country. We compute them as direct linkages and total linkages. With  being an I-O matrix, total 
linkages include direct and indirect effects and are based on the  matrix, while direct 
linkages do not take into account the indirect multiplier effects and are based only on . The 
existing literature uses only the direct linkages. Specifically, we compute the linkages for industry 
















where  is a measure of size for firm i (we use sales),  is the Leontief inverse of the I-O matrix 
,  is the Ghosh inverse of I-O matrix ,  is the share of foreign ownership in 
firm i, ∈  is the indicator variable equal to one if firm i is in industry j and zero 
otherwise. The key difference between the Leontief and Ghosh inverse matrices is that the former 
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is estimated from an I-O matrix’s input coefficients, while the latter uses the output coefficients. 
Thus, they represent the linkages suggested by a demand-driven and supply-driven model of the 
economy, respectively.  
The next three explanatory variables capture vertical linkages or transfer of capabilities: 
SMNE -- the share of sales to multinational enterprises, Export -- the share of export in sales, and 
Import -- the share of imported inputs.  
In addition to sector ( , country (  and year ( 	 fixed effects, we include the 
following variables to control for firm-specific factors deemed to be important in the literature:22F23 
L (the number of employees) and L2 measure the size of the firm. The argument for 
including size is that large companies have more resources to innovate and can benefit from 
economies of scale in R&D production and marketing.23F24   
EDU (the share of workers with a university education) and SKILL (the share of skilled 
workers) capture human capital in the firm. These variables may be expected to be positively 
correlated with innovation if EDU reflects the involvement of workers in R&D and more skilled 
workers (SKILL) are able to give feedback to the firm on how to improve a product. 
Age of the firm is the log of the number of years since the firm began operations in the 
country. Two hypotheses are plausible: one suggesting that older firms developed routines that are 
resistant to innovation and another suggesting that older firms will accumulate the knowledge 
necessary to innovate. There is evidence for both hypotheses. 
CNM is a dummy equal to one if the firm competes in the national markets and zero 
otherwise (e.g., when a firm only competes in a regional or local market). We expect CNM to have 
a positive effect on innovation, given that the firm operates in a larger market. 
                                                 
23 See Becheikh, Landry and Amara (2006) for a review of the literature on innovation. 
24 This variable is probably one of the most studied firm characteristics determining innovation, in part because it also 
captures one of Schumpeter’s (1943) hypotheses.  
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State Owned Enterprise (SOE) is a dummy variable equal to one if the government owns 
50% or more of the firm and zero otherwise. This variable is expected to be negatively correlated 
with innovation for a variety of reasons, including a poor system of rewards for innovative 
activities in these enterprises.  
FOREIGN is a dummy variable equal to one if foreigners own 50% or more of the firm 
and zero otherwise.  
CU is capacity utilization. Adding this variable allows us to adjust the effects of the firm 
size variable(s) with an index of factor-intensity. 
Lopt is the optimal size of employment relative to the current employment. (This 
information was collected from managers as part of the survey). Like CU, Lopt can be interpreted 
as a measure of capacity utilization. The expected coefficient sign for CU and Lopt is ambiguous.  
 Location (Loc) is a set of dummies for size of population where the firm is operating or 
headquartered. This will control for potential differences in knowledge available in larger v. 
smaller cities. Appendix Table A1 contains a more detailed description of our variables. 
In order to assess the extent to which the estimated effects are specific to particular settings 
or nonlinear in key variables, we also separately estimate the basic specification for each of the 
following subsamples:  
Sector: manufacturing vs. services,  
Ownership: private domestic, foreign and state, 
Employment size: 1= 2-10 employees, 2 = 11- 49, 3 = 50-99, 4 = 100+ 
Regions: CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States -- Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, 
Kazakhstan, Russia), EU (European Union -- Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia), and SEE (South-Eastern Europe -- Albania, Croatia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) 
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Red tape: firms are grouped into three bins based on manager’s time spent with official. 
(1= least time, 3 = most time).  
Age: new (founded after 1991), old (founded before 1991), and de-novo (founded after 
1991 as a private firms). 
3. Empirical Results 
 
In Tables 1 and 2 below, we report the summary statistics. As may be seen from Table 1, our sample 
covers 18 emerging market economies in the EU, SEE (including Turkey) and the CIS. The sample 
contains several hundred firms in each country, with larger countries (Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine) each having more than 800 firms. Croatia has the smallest sample 
with 291 firms.  The mean and standard deviation statistics in Table 2 suggest that the values taken 
on by the variables used in our analysis are reasonable and display considerable variation. About 
38% of the firms report that they introduced a new product, while about 30% have introduced a new 
technology. Both the total and direct horizontal, forward and backward linkages (common across 
firms in a given industry, time, and country) take on values in the 0.3 - 0.5 range, while the 
corresponding linkages with respect to OECD fall in the 0.2 – 0.3 range. The share of sales going 
to multinational firms averages 0.07, the share of sales exported averages 0.09 and the share of 
imported inputs in the value of all inputs averages 0.29. The average share of skilled workers is 0.49, 
while workers with a university education average 27% of the firms’ total labor force. About 10% 
of the firms have majority state ownership, while about 12% have majority foreign ownership. 




3.1  Baseline Estimates 
 
In Tables 3-6, we report the estimated coefficients on the industry-level linkages  and micro-level 
linkages . In these tables we report estimates based on total linkages (using the  matrix), 
while in the appendix tables we report the corresponding estimates based on direct linkages (using 
the  matrix). As may be seen from the first row of Table 3, the estimated product innovation 
spillovers based on the entire data set for the usual industry-level, input-output linkage variables, 
are all statistically insignificant. This finding is consistent with much of the literature that finds 
insignificant spillover effects on productivity. In contrast, the corresponding product innovation 
spillovers based on the firm-level (micro) data are all positive and statistically highly significant. 
Quantitatively these estimates are also substantial. When converted to marginal effects at means, 
our point estimates on , 	and	  range from 0.07 to 0.09 and the standard 
deviation of these variables are also between 0.2 and 0.4. Thus, a one standard deviation increase in 
, ,  can raise our measures of innovation by about 0.015 to 0.030, or 
approximately 4 to 7 percent, given that the unconditional means of the dependent variables are 
about 0.3 to 0.4.  Our estimates based on the entire sample of firms hence suggest that the industry-
level, I-O approach to estimating FDI spillovers found in the existing literature may be misleading 
in that the industry-level data do not capture the positive innovation spillover effects that can be 
detected with firm-level data. 
The uniformly positive and statistically significant micro-level spillover effects are also 
found in Table 3 when we carry out the estimation on the following subsamples of firms: service 
sector firms, old firms, new firms, state-owned firms, domestic privately-owned firms, firms located 
in EU countries, and firms in which officials spend considerable time with local officials 
(considerable red tape). Moreover, there are several categories of firms in which we find the effect 
of the share of sales to MNEs to be insignificant, but the effects of the share of sales exported and 
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share of inputs imported to be positive and significant: manufacturing firms, de-novo firms, small 
and medium sized firms, MNEs, firms located in SEE, and firms in which officials spend little or 
only moderate amount of time with officials (low red tape). The positive effect of interacting with 
foreign firms is hence positive for most types of firms, with manufacturing being the only sector 
(about one-third of the sampled firms) where a greater share of sales going to MNEs is not associated 
with greater product innovation. Interestingly, as may be seen from all the rows of Table 3, when 
we carry out estimations for the various subsamples of firms, the estimated industry-level linkages 
are virtually all statistically insignificant,24F25 again suggesting that the aggregate analysis based on 
input-output tables is misleading. Finally, as may be seen from the Appendix Table A2, the estimates 
based on direct linkages are similar to those based on total linkages. 
Our findings with respect to the adoption of new technology are similar to those obtained 
for developing a new product. Using the total linkage method, we find in Table 4 that the estimated 
spillovers based on the firm-level micro data are all positive and statistically highly significant for 
the sample of all firms, as well as for the subsamples of manufacturing firms, service sector firms, 
old firms, domestic private firms, and firms whose managers do not spend much time with officials. 
Our firm-level technology innovation findings are hence stronger than our corresponding findings 
with respect to product innovation in that manufacturing firms register a positive spillover effect not 
only with respect to exporting and importing, but also with respect to supplying the locally based 
MNEs. Firms in a number of other subsamples generate significant positive effects with respect to 
exporting and importing, but insignificant effects with respect to sales to MNEs: new firms, de-novo 
firms, firms that spend a moderate amount of time with officials, and firms operating in SEE and 
CIS. In contrast, large firms, state-owned firms and firms operating the EU countries benefit from 
                                                 
25 Of the 581 estimated coefficients in the first three columns of Table 3, only 7 are significant and two of these are 
negative. 
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selling to MNEs and exporting, but not from linkages derived from importing inputs. As before, 
spillovers based on industry-level variables are mostly insignificant.25F 26   This finding is again 
consistent with much of the literature that finds insignificant spillover effects on productivity. 
Finally, the estimates based on direct linkages, reported in Table A3, are similar. 
3.2  Spillovers by the Source of FDI 
 
In Table 5 we present the estimated product innovation spillovers when we distinguish whether 
foreign presence is from OECD or non-OECD countries. As may be seen from the table, the firm-
level micro linkage effects, which cannot distinguish OECD vs. non-OECD FDI effects, are 
virtually identical to those found earlier. The industry-level estimates may be split by OECD vs. 
non-OECD origin and they suggest that the presence of OECD firms, as compared to non-OECD 
firms, has a positive horizontal linkage effect in the sample of all firms, as well as in subsamples of 
firms that operate in the service sector or are new, large, in domestic private ownership, or in CIS. 
The backward OECD linkages are all insignificant except for the service sector firms where one 
finds a significant positive linkage effect of OECD as well as non-OECD firms, and the backward 
OECD linkage effect of firms in the EU countries, where one finds a surprisingly negative effect. 
The forward OECD linkage effects are all insignificant except for a positive effect in firms operating 
in EU. It is notable that the presence of non-OECD firms has a negative horizontal linkage effect on 
very small firms and a positive backward linkage effect on firms in the service sector and on large 
firms.  The corresponding direct linkage effects, reported in Appendix Table A4, are similar for 
OECD horizontal linkages but they suggest that a number of OECD backward linkages and forward 
non-OECD linkages are positive and few are also negative. These findings suggest that relying on 
the direct linkage effects may be misleading. 
                                                 
26 Of the few that are statistically significant, most are negative. 
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The corresponding estimated technology innovation spillovers that distinguish between 
foreign presence from OECD and non-OECD countries are reported in Table 6. The firm-level micro 
linkage effects that cannot be split between OECD and non-OECD FDI presence are again strong 
and similar to those found for technology innovation earlier. Unlike in the case of product innovation, 
the estimated technology innovation spillovers at the industry-level suggest that the presence of non-
OECD firms has a negative horizontal linkage effect in the sample of all firms, as well as in several 
specific subsamples of firms: firms operating in the service sector, firms that are old, medium sized 
firms, SOEs, foreign owned firms, privately owned firms,  firms that spend moderate amount of 
time with officials, and firms in SEE. The difference is that there are now more subsamples of firms 
where one detects a positive horizontal spillover effect of OECD presence: firms that operate in the 
service sector, are small, have domestic private ownership, and spend moderate amount of time with 
officials. We also find a positive backward linkage effect associated with the presence of OECD 
firms in the sample of all firms, as well as the subsamples of firms in the service sector, old firms, 
micro, medium-sized and large firms, SOEs, and firms that spend moderate amount of time with 
officials. In all of these cases except for the medium sized firms, the base effect of non-OECD 
foreign presence is insignificant rather than negative. Finally, the forward linkages associated with 
both OECD and non-OECD firms’ presence are mostly insignificant or negative, with the exception 
of a positive non-OECD linkage of firms in SEE. In terms of direct technology innovation spillovers, 
we show in Appendix Table A5 that these estimates are somewhat similar to those based on total 
linkages in the case of horizontal spillovers, but they differ considerably from total linkage effects 
with respect to forward and backward spillovers. This result strengthens our earlier finding that firm-
level spillover effects are more reliable than the partial or direct industry-level effects common in 
the literature. 
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3.3 Robustness Tests 
 
In the previous sections, we have documented an interesting set of patterns for the sample as a whole 
and for a number of subsamples. However, these patterns do not necessarily imply causal 
relationships, which are difficult to establish in observational studies. A major concern is that in our 
specification we may be omitting factors that potentially limit the growth of firms and thus also their 
incentives to innovate. In order to overcome this concern, we employ the control function approach 
in which we use proxies to control for potentially omitted factors that might bias the estimated 
linkage effects.  
The main advantage of using this approach is that BEEPS provides a rich set of proxies that 
enable us to rule out a number of alternative explanations.26F27 In particular, we use each firm’s self-
reported assessment of a large number of potentially limiting factors, ranging from constraints 
imposed on the firms by corruption to regulation, taxes, and electricity problems. Our approach is 
to add to our basic specification an additional regressor capturing a particular omitted factor. Ideally, 
we would like to include all of these potentially important controls simultaneously but, since many 
variables have missing observations or are collected only in one of the BEEPS waves, including all 
variables will shrink the sample size dramatically.  As a result, we include variables one at a time. 
However, even if we include many controls simultaneously, our results to do not change materially.    
 The estimated coefficients of the augmented specification for a new product innovation are 
reported in Table 7, while those for a new technology innovation are reported in Table 8. As may 
                                                 
27 Finding credible instrumental variables is a challenging task in observational studies. We considered three candidates 
for instrumental variables. The first two instruments were (i) self-reported constraints imposed by transportation 
difficulties and (ii) custom and trade regulations. Both of these constraints are  likely to limit long distance trade, thus 
making it more likely that MNEs wishing to sell in the country will open plants in the country and domestic firms will 
supply and purchase from the MNEs, as well as compete with them. The third instrumental variable was based on how 
important business associations and chambers are in finding suppliers.  It may be expected that if firms use business 
associations and chambers, they are more likely to find a foreign firm than if the use more proximate channels (friends, 
family, government, and former employees). We found using these instrumental variables yields the same qualitative 
conclusions although the effect are imprecisely estimated. 
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be seen from the tables, we first explore if factors related to problems with various aspects of 
infrastructure (telecommunications, electricity, transportation, access to land, and title or leasing of 
land) lower the firm’s ability to innovate and also its industry-level and firm-specific linkages. We 
find that these factors have no effect in that the estimated linkages are very similar to those found 
in our original specification. We obtain the same result when we construct an index of limiting 
factors (average score). We next estimate augmented specifications that control, alternatively, for 
tax rates and tax administration, various forms of regulation, skills and education of the labor force, 
economic uncertainty and instability, corruption and crime, anti-competitive practices and contract 
violations, education of a manager, indebtedness, productivity, access to and cost of finance, quality 
of courts, information about suppliers and customers, unofficial payments and tax reporting, various 
forms of competitive and customer pressures, and experience with lost electric power, water, and 
phone connection, as well as lost products due to breakage, spoilage or theft while in transit.27F28 Each 
of these factors may arguably co-vary with the linkages and including these factors as regressors 
could in principle reduce the significance of our estimated effects of linkages on innovation. We 
show that controlling for each of these factors has no effect on our baseline results. Only in three of 
the forty two regressions that we estimate in Table 7 and in one of the forty two regressions that we 
estimate in Table 8 does the coefficient on the share of sales to MNEs become marginally 
insignificant. All the other two hundred and forty nine firm-specific linkage coefficients remain 
significant. Hence, the robustness of the baseline estimates to this large battery of control function 
tests is remarkable and it suggests that we are indeed identifying a causal relationship. 
 
 
                                                 




Our estimates, based on large firm-level and industry-level data sets from 18 countries, suggest 
that FDI and trade have strong positive spillover effects on innovation by domestic firms in 
emerging markets. Moreover, we find that the spillover effects can be detected with micro data at 
the firm-level, but that using linkage variables computed from input-output tables at the industry 
level yields much weaker, and usually insignificant, estimated effects. Furthermore, there is 
generally little difference in whether the industry-level spillover effect is computed as a direct 
effect based on the input-output matrix (the usual approach in the literature) or as a total effect 
based on the inverses of input-output matrices.  
These patterns are consistent with spillover effects being rather proximate. In other words, 
spillover effects on innovation from foreign firms to domestic firms appear to be limited to 
domestic firms immediately connected to foreign firms. Simply being in an industry populated by 
foreign firms or an industry buying from or selling to industries with strong foreign presence 
generally has a weak, if any, effect on innovation. An immediate policy implication of these 
findings is that popular requirements of foreign firms to have significant local content (i.e., a 
certain fraction of value added or inputs has to be local) may be justified.  
 We also document heterogeneity in the strength of the effect across sources of foreign 
presence. Our firm-level data do not permit us to distinguish between the effects of FDI from more 
advanced (OECD) and less advanced (non-OECD) countries, but we are able to do so at the level 
of the industry (input-output) linkages. Our estimates suggest that the presence of OECD firms, as 
compared to non-OECD firms, has a positive horizontal linkage effect on product innovation in 
the sample of all firms, as well as in subsamples of various types of firms. The backward OECD 
linkages are all insignificant except for the service sector firms where one finds a significant 
positive linkage effect of OECD as well as non-OECD firms, and the backward OECD linkage 
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effect of firms in the EU countries, where one finds a surprisingly negative effect. The forward 
OECD linkage effects are all insignificant except for a positive effect in firms operating in EU. It 
is notable that the presence of non-OECD firms has a negative horizontal linkage effect on very 
small firms and a positive backward linkage effect on firms in the service sector and on large 
firms. Unlike in the case of product innovation, the estimated technology innovation spillovers at 
the industry-level suggest that the presence of non-OECD firms has a negative horizontal linkage 
effect in the sample of all firms, as well as in several specific subsamples of firms 
 Our results have important implications for interpreting the existing literature, which has 
focused on the effects of FDI and trade on (total factor) productivity rather than on innovation, has 
tended to use the industry-level rather than firm-level measures of horizontal and vertical linkages, 
and usually used data from a single country. Since measured productivity (a) captures the effects 
of both market power and efficiency (rather than just efficiency) of firms, (b) is a noisy outcome 
variable, and (c) suffers from endogeneity problems in estimation, our focus on innovation 
provides potentially more direct estimates of the true effects of foreign presence on the 
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Country N. obs. Percent 
Albania 318          2.85  
Armenia 495          4.43  
Belarus 542          4.85  
Bulgaria 514          4.60  
Croatia 291          2.60  
Czech Republic 512          4.58  
Estonia 311          2.78  
Hungary 805          7.20  
Kazakhstan 804          7.19  
Latvia 330          2.95  
Lithuania 350          3.13  
Poland 1,386        12.40  
Romania 789          7.06  
Russia 1,014          9.07  
Slovakia 346          3.10  
Slovenia 375          3.36  
Turkey 975          8.72  
Ukraine 1,018          9.11  





Variable Mean st.dev. 
New good 0.379 0.485 
New technology 0.302 0.459 
Horizontal linkage (direct) 0.384 0.299 
Backward linkage (direct) 0.394 0.237 
Forward linkage (direct) 0.378 0.231 
Horizontal linkage (total) 0.384 0.299 
Backward linkage (total) 0.424 0.245 
Forward linkage (total) 0.376 0.227 
Horizontal linkage (direct, OECD) 0.203 0.213 
Backward linkage (direct, OECD) 0.214 0.167 
Forward linkage (direct, OECD) 0.203 0.156 
Horizontal linkage (total, OECD) 0.203 0.213 
Backward linkage (total, OECD) 0.231 0.170 
Forward linkage (total, OECD) 0.199 0.149 
Share of sales to MNES 0.073 0.201 
IMPORT 0.290 0.370 
EXPORT 0.091 0.216 
LnL 3.194 1.632 
Share of skilled workers 0.489 0.310 
Share of workers with a university education 0.274 0.293 
Markup 0.214 0.134 
Age (log years) 2.367 0.770 
Optimal size of employment relative to the current employment 107.328 30.135 
Capacity utilization 0.798 0.204 
State ownership (dummy) 0.104 0.305 
Foreign ownership (dummy) 0.128 0.334 






Sample Industry-level linkages  Firm-level linkages Number of 









(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
All Firms 0.098 0.459 -0.134  0.191*** 0.246*** 0.235*** 11,651 
 (0.095) (0.407) (0.494)  (0.067) (0.034) (0.066)  
Manufacturing 0.105 -0.491 1.049**  0.073 0.259*** 0.214*** 3,915 
 (0.138) (0.438) (0.482)  (0.106) (0.063) (0.090)  
Services 0.116 1.882*** -1.775**  0.314*** 0.206*** 0.237** 6,299 
 (0.133) (0.670) (0.851)  (0.097) (0.042) (0.110)  
New firms 0.052 0.534 -0.227  0.148* 0.176*** 0.184*** 8,539 
 (0.103) (0.508) (0.612)  (0.081) (0.039) (0.078)  
Old firms 0.185 0.518 -0.190  0.302*** 0.445*** 0.347*** 3,110 
 (0.189) (0.573) (0.657)  (0.115) (0.082) (0.116)  
De-novo firms 0.120 0.652 -0.347  0.108 0.160*** 0.261*** 6,341 
 (0.117) (0.557) (0.665)  (0.099) (0.046) (0.104)  
Labor size: 2-10 employees -0.047 0.591 0.031  0.181 0.251*** 0.509*** 4,684 
 (0.123) (0.613) (0.717)  (0.141) (0.054) (0.143)  
Labor size: 11-49 employees 0.197 -0.176 0.065  0.127 0.268*** 0.205* 3,498 
 (0.182) (0.710) (0.844)  (0.109) (0.071) (0.120)  
Labor size: 50-100 employees -0.209 1.096 -0.710  0.292 -0.007 0.223 1,204 
 (0.239) (1.065) (1.321)  (0.186) (0.122) (0.177)  
Labor size: 100+ employees 0.405*** 1.012 -0.534  0.281*** 0.345*** 0.181 2,252 
 (0.150) (0.619) (0.694)  (0.116) (0.088) (0.121)  
State owned only -0.163 1.145 -0.446  0.452** 0.281** 0.415* 1,205 
 (0.235) (1.104) (1.283)  (0.204) (0.137) (0.238)  
Foreign owned only -0.096 -0.782 0.729  0.122 0.219*** 0.241* 1,491 
 (0.242) (0.808) (0.973)  (0.144) (0.091) (0.127)  
Priv. domestic owned only 0.189* 0.586 -0.246  0.173** 0.252*** 0.247*** 8,971 
 (0.102) (0.501) (0.602)  (0.089) (0.039) (0.081)  
Time spent with officials: low 0.131 0.978 -1.078  0.158 0.218*** 0.196* 4,311 
 (0.164) (0.686) (0.831)  (0.112) (0.057) (0.112)  
Time spent with officials: med 0.015 0.141 0.435  0.095 0.239*** 0.267*** 3,791 
 (0.128) (0.552) (0.658)  (0.111) (0.062) (0.098)  
Time spent with officials: high 0.030 -0.236 0.923  0.389*** 0.227*** 0.334*** 2,836 
 (0.162) (0.646) (0.819)  (0.134) (0.070) (0.129)  
CIS 0.343* -0.041 0.157  0.109 0.312*** 0.063 3,870 
 (0.180) (0.596) (0.866)  (0.144) (0.062) (0.134)  
EU -0.030 -0.631 1.475*  0.263*** 0.163*** 0.244*** 4,411 
 (0.151) (0.781) (0.788)  (0.100) (0.051) (0.095)  
SEE -0.434* 1.581 -1.165  0.068 0.243*** 0.374*** 2,388 





Sample Industry-level linkages  Firm-level linkages Number of 









(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
All Firms -0.046 0.341 -0.586  0.190*** 0.272*** 0.187*** 11,570 
 (0.108) (0.328) (0.415)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.064)  
Manufacturing 0.158 0.009 -0.063  0.182* 0.253*** 0.210*** 3,888 
 (0.179) (0.514) (0.583)  (0.099) (0.075) (0.088)  
Services -0.037 0.487 -0.833  0.186** 0.257*** 0.179* 6,260 
 (0.139) (0.449) (0.619)  (0.091) (0.051) (0.100)  
New firms 0.019 -0.018 -0.415  0.071 0.225*** 0.194*** 8,474 
 (0.112) (0.429) (0.549)  (0.077) (0.046) (0.079)  
Old firms -0.224 1.449*** -1.189*  0.452*** 0.399*** 0.225** 3,096 
 (0.198) (0.609) (0.711)  (0.115) (0.079) (0.117)  
De-novo firms 0.040 -0.474 0.247  0.054 0.180*** 0.173* 6,294 
 (0.125) (0.535) (0.670)  (0.095) (0.053) (0.099)  
Labor size: 2-10 employees 0.100 -0.360 0.205  0.229* 0.243*** 0.256 4,658 
 (0.140) (0.640) (0.736)  (0.130) (0.056) (0.174)  
Labor size: 11-49 employees 0.048 -0.483 0.125  -0.087 0.219*** 0.368*** 3,482 
 (0.193) (0.600) (0.770)  (0.120) (0.079) (0.118)  
Labor size: 50-100 employees -0.131 3.055*** -2.771**  0.386** 0.248* 0.192 1,188 
 (0.236) (1.050) (1.241)  (0.171) (0.135) (0.160)  
Labor size: 100+ employees -0.132 1.466*** -1.818***  0.407*** 0.448*** 0.161 2,234 
 (0.169) (0.605) (0.777)  (0.132) (0.092) (0.109)  
State owned only -0.285 0.467 -0.700  0.434** 0.590*** 0.180 1,200 
 (0.218) (0.974) (1.189)  (0.201) (0.134) (0.223)  
Foreign owned only -0.229 0.467 -1.168  0.083 0.370*** 0.158 1,472 
 (0.222) (0.741) (0.892)  (0.141) (0.110) (0.130)  
Priv. domestic owned only 0.097 0.250 -0.451  0.233*** 0.225*** 0.263*** 8,917 
 (0.114) (0.431) (0.530)  (0.079) (0.047) (0.082)  
Time spent with officials: low -0.116 0.649 -1.188  0.250** 0.216*** 0.281** 4,272 
 (0.155) (0.626) (0.753)  (0.117) (0.067) (0.127)  
Time spent with officials: med 0.059 0.817 -0.753  0.133 0.371*** 0.215** 3,771 
 (0.147) (0.602) (0.747)  (0.114) (0.065) (0.112)  
Time spent with officials: high -0.148 -0.805 0.519  0.169 0.252*** 0.130 2,815 
 (0.165) (0.596) (0.749)  (0.131) (0.080) (0.143)  
CIS -0.390** 0.506 -0.822  0.028 0.371*** 0.241** 3,848 
 (0.173) (0.545) (0.831)  (0.134) (0.069) (0.120)  
EU -0.141 -0.281 0.032  0.283*** 0.190*** 0.040 4,384 
 (0.145) (0.805) (0.786)  (0.100) (0.062) (0.098)  
SEE -0.803*** -1.293 1.601*  0.134 0.251*** 0.339*** 2,379 






Sample Industry-level linkages  Firm-level linkages Number of 









Horizontal Backward Forward  Horizontal Backward Forward  
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) 
All Firms -0.133 0.420 0.126  0.235** 0.679 -0.494  0.188*** 0.246*** 0.238*** 11,651 
 (0.135) (0.508) (0.673)  (0.112) (0.539) (0.675)  (0.067) (0.034) (0.066)  
Manufacturing -0.022 -0.292 1.065*  0.154 -0.702 1.093  0.070 0.259*** 0.214*** 3,915 
 (0.202) (0.526) (0.604)  (0.157) (0.731) (0.837)  (0.106) (0.063) (0.090)  
Services -0.290 2.143*** -1.867  0.385*** 1.932*** -1.767  0.308*** 0.204*** 0.245** 6,299 
 (0.205) (0.916) (1.349)  (0.148) (0.813) (1.084)  (0.097) (0.041) (0.110)  
New firms -0.252 0.572 -0.050  0.231* 0.710 -0.499  0.144* 0.176*** 0.190*** 8,539 
 (0.174) (0.663) (0.875)  (0.126) (0.616) (0.799)  (0.081) (0.039) (0.078)  
Old firms 0.081 0.425 0.125  0.245 0.763 -0.645  0.301*** 0.444*** 0.346*** 3,110 
 (0.248) (0.694) (0.844)  (0.236) (0.921) (1.160)  (0.115) (0.082) (0.116)  
De-novo firms -0.062 0.677 -0.310  0.227 0.759 -0.429  0.106 0.161*** 0.262*** 6,341 
 (0.195) (0.772) (0.988)  (0.144) (0.651) (0.845)  (0.099) (0.046) (0.104)  
Labor size: 2-10 employees -0.327* 0.350 0.134  0.140 1.128 -0.156  0.177 0.252*** 0.511*** 4,684 
 (0.189) (0.845) (1.100)  (0.143) (0.743) (0.910)  (0.142) (0.054) (0.143)  
Labor size: 11-49 employees -0.039 -0.210 0.063  0.350 0.176 -0.111  0.125 0.270*** 0.211* 3,498 
 (0.256) (0.908) (1.136)  (0.241) (0.963) (1.226)  (0.109) (0.071) (0.120)  
Labor size: 50-100 employees -0.559 0.572 1.127  -0.116 1.242 -2.074  0.293 -0.022 0.209 1,204 
 (0.398) (1.367) (1.828)  (0.302) (1.405) (1.792)  (0.186) (0.122) (0.176)  
Labor size: 100+ employees 0.033 1.455** -0.184  0.597*** 0.445 -0.633  0.267** 0.337*** 0.187 2,252 
 (0.252) (0.712) (0.850)  (0.189) (1.068) (1.299)  (0.117) (0.089) (0.121)  
State owned only -0.278 1.718 -0.418  -0.197 -0.265 0.355  0.437** 0.279** 0.420* 1,205 
 (0.366) (1.404) (1.770)  (0.306) (1.562) (2.049)  (0.204) (0.138) (0.238)  
Foreign owned only -0.442 -1.221 1.235  0.146 0.352 -0.358  0.131 0.208** 0.253** 1,491 
 (0.317) (1.028) (1.374)  (0.306) (1.306) (1.628)  (0.144) (0.092) (0.126)  
Priv. domestic owned only -0.119 0.594 0.041  0.355*** 0.742 -0.587  0.167* 0.253*** 0.248*** 8,971 
 (0.156) (0.659) (0.854)  (0.121) (0.596) (0.739)  (0.089) (0.039) (0.081)  
Time spent with officials: low 0.025 1.302 -1.362  0.187 0.643 -0.697  0.155 0.220*** 0.200* 4,311 
 (0.267) (1.033) (1.237)  (0.202) (0.897) (1.144)  (0.112) (0.057) (0.112)  
Time spent with officials: med -0.137 0.499 0.616  0.069 -0.389 0.443  0.086 0.236*** 0.262*** 3,791 
 (0.218) (0.576) (0.768)  (0.166) (1.023) (1.132)  (0.112) (0.062) (0.099)  
Time spent with officials: high -0.261 -0.413 0.899  0.335 0.673 0.342  0.382*** 0.228*** 0.338*** 2,836 
 (0.248) (0.777) (1.022)  (0.216) (1.035) (1.415)  (0.135) (0.070) (0.129)  
CIS 0.167 0.139 0.066  0.660*** 0.258 -0.541  0.110 0.312*** 0.072 3,870 
 (0.224) (0.677) (0.951)  (0.245) (1.433) (2.366)  (0.145) (0.062) (0.134)  
EU -0.157 0.852 0.746  0.107 -2.702*** 2.797***  0.250*** 0.164*** 0.227*** 4,411 
 (0.168) (0.883) (0.910)  (0.196) (1.110) (1.113)  (0.099) (0.051) (0.096)  
SEE -0.342 1.525 -1.125  -0.568 2.012 -1.751  0.068 0.243*** 0.374*** 2,388 




Sample Industry-level linkages  Firm-level linkages Number of 









Horizontal Backward Forward  Horizontal Backward Forward  
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) 
All Firms -0.357*** -0.031 -0.562  0.190 1.373*** -1.017  0.190*** 0.270*** 0.196*** 11,570 
 (0.132) (0.425) (0.550)  (0.133) (0.560) (0.722)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.064)  
Manufacturing -0.095 -0.310 -0.685  0.318 0.662 0.454  0.179* 0.256*** 0.219*** 3,888 
 (0.266) (0.629) (0.624)  (0.213) (0.962) (1.134)  (0.100) (0.076) (0.086)  
Services -0.623*** -0.002 -0.320  0.355** 1.822*** -1.596  0.186** 0.249*** 0.197** 6,260 
 (0.153) (0.636) (0.944)  (0.171) (0.664) (1.009)  (0.090) (0.052) (0.099)  
New firms -0.257 -0.312 -0.375  0.218 0.800 -0.754  0.072 0.225*** 0.201*** 8,474 
 (0.173) (0.612) (0.806)  (0.134) (0.644) (0.843)  (0.077) (0.046) (0.078)  
Old firms -0.603** 0.841 -1.108  0.093 3.079*** -1.998*  0.454*** 0.387*** 0.243** 3,096 
 (0.271) (0.704) (0.909)  (0.248) (0.955) (1.204)  (0.115) (0.079) (0.117)  
De-novo firms -0.160 -0.740 0.264  0.181 0.171 0.041  0.053 0.182*** 0.176* 6,294 
 (0.214) (0.751) (0.955)  (0.147) (0.783) (0.995)  (0.095) (0.053) (0.100)  
Labor size: 2-10 employees -0.110 -1.760** 1.381  0.261 1.595* -1.378  0.230* 0.237*** 0.261 4,658 
 (0.206) (0.859) (1.008)  (0.179) (0.852) (1.078)  (0.130) (0.057) (0.175)  
Labor size: 11-49 employees -0.540** -0.160 -0.825  0.451** -0.033 0.822  -0.091 0.225*** 0.388*** 3,482 
 (0.263) (0.850) (1.084)  (0.232) (0.849) (1.109)  (0.120) (0.078) (0.118)  
Labor size: 50-100 employees -0.788* 2.520* -2.093  0.216 4.384*** -3.881**  0.387** 0.227* 0.210 1,188 
 (0.469) (1.418) (1.809)  (0.292) (1.458) (1.773)  (0.170) (0.136) (0.160)  
Labor size: 100+ employees -0.399 1.186 -1.649*  0.075 2.408** -2.502  0.408*** 0.443*** 0.167 2,234 
 (0.263) (0.722) (0.982)  (0.234) (1.182) (1.543)  (0.132) (0.092) (0.109)  
State owned only -0.562* -0.249 -0.899  0.205 3.482** -2.064  0.458** 0.589*** 0.161 1,200 
 (0.334) (1.218) (1.629)  (0.303) (1.524) (1.919)  (0.203) (0.134) (0.225)  
Foreign owned only -0.737** 0.663 -1.561  0.123 0.967 -1.181  0.087 0.358*** 0.173 1,472 
 (0.317) (0.889) (1.202)  (0.279) (1.249) (1.441)  (0.142) (0.111) (0.131)  
Priv. domestic owned only -0.279* -0.040 -0.349  0.335*** 1.030 -0.805  0.227*** 0.224*** 0.270*** 8,917 
 (0.168) (0.582) (0.744)  (0.134) (0.677) (0.849)  (0.078) (0.047) (0.082)  
Time spent with officials: low -0.263 0.340 -1.277  0.068 1.531 -1.509  0.250** 0.214*** 0.283** 4,272 
 (0.266) (0.863) (1.046)  (0.193) (0.975) (1.184)  (0.117) (0.067) (0.127)  
Time spent with officials: med -0.554** 0.643 -0.186  0.418** 1.759* -1.807  0.131 0.362*** 0.229** 3,771 
 (0.244) (0.828) (1.080)  (0.180) (0.957) (1.186)  (0.114) (0.065) (0.112)  
Time spent with officials: high -0.131 -0.988 -0.100  -0.129 -0.045 0.847  0.175 0.252*** 0.125 2,815 
 (0.226) (0.627) (0.865)  (0.224) (1.233) (1.624)  (0.130) (0.081) (0.143)  
CIS -0.193 0.186 -0.710  -0.722** 0.577 -0.210  0.032 0.371*** 0.232** 3,848 
 (0.197) (0.568) (0.815)  (0.335) (1.418) (2.355)  (0.133) (0.069) (0.119)  
EU -0.332 0.567 -1.502  0.011 -0.977 1.488  0.277*** 0.190*** 0.038 4,384 
 (0.211) (0.935) (1.068)  (0.207) (1.220) (1.318)  (0.099) (0.063) (0.097)  
SEE -1.232*** -1.641* 1.661*  -0.273 -0.544 1.659  0.141 0.243*** 0.351*** 2,379 




Table 7: New Product; additional controls. 
Additional control Industry-level linkages  Firm-specific linkages Number of 









(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Problematic factors         
Telecommunications 0.097 0.475 -0.155  0.190*** 0.245*** 0.236*** 11,650 
 (0.095) (0.407) (0.494)  (0.067) (0.034) (0.066)  
Electricity 0.098 0.485 -0.170  0.191*** 0.249*** 0.235*** 11,650 
 (0.096) (0.405) (0.492)  (0.068) (0.034) (0.066)  
Transportation 0.098 0.467 -0.148  0.187*** 0.245*** 0.235*** 11,649 
 (0.095) (0.407) (0.494)  (0.067) (0.034) (0.067)  
Access to land 0.102 0.469 -0.159  0.189*** 0.246*** 0.236*** 11,642 
 (0.098) (0.408) (0.495)  (0.067) (0.034) (0.066)  
Title or leasing of land 0.101 0.437 -0.173  0.200*** 0.245*** 0.236*** 11,646 
 (0.097) (0.406) (0.493)  (0.068) (0.034) (0.066)  
Tax rates 0.096 0.439 -0.145  0.195*** 0.243*** 0.233*** 11,642 
 (0.097) (0.411) (0.498)  (0.067) (0.033) (0.066)  
Tax administration 0.105 0.457 -0.150  0.191*** 0.233*** 0.229*** 11,622 
 (0.097) (0.410) (0.495)  (0.068) (0.033) (0.067)  
Customs and trade regulations 0.114 0.445 -0.139  0.189*** 0.237*** 0.224*** 11,637 
 (0.099) (0.408) (0.495)  (0.068) (0.033) (0.066)  
Business licensing and permits 0.102 0.461 -0.194  0.194*** 0.241*** 0.230*** 11,645 
 (0.098) (0.408) (0.494)  (0.067) (0.033) (0.066)  
Labor regulations 0.103 0.480 -0.137  0.192*** 0.241*** 0.228*** 11,647 
 (0.097) (0.411) (0.498)  (0.067) (0.033) (0.066)  
Skills and education of available workers 0.100 0.421 -0.159  0.190*** 0.237*** 0.229*** 11,647 
 (0.097) (0.411) (0.493)  (0.068) (0.033) (0.066)  
Economic policy uncertainty 0.092 0.420 -0.126  0.193*** 0.240*** 0.225*** 11,645 
 (0.096) (0.408) (0.493)  (0.068) (0.034) (0.066)  
Macroeconomic instability 0.117 0.430 -0.150  0.190*** 0.238*** 0.223*** 11,641 
 (0.099) (0.402) (0.487)  (0.068) (0.033) (0.067)  
Functioning of the judiciary 0.104 0.468 -0.162  0.190*** 0.243*** 0.234*** 11,644 
 (0.098) (0.409) (0.495)  (0.068) (0.033) (0.066)  
Corruption 0.101 0.472 -0.147  0.193*** 0.244*** 0.234*** 11,636 
 (0.095) (0.407) (0.493)  (0.068) (0.033) (0.066)  
Street crime/theft/disorder 0.111 0.483 -0.174  0.193*** 0.244*** 0.234*** 11,631 
 (0.094) (0.408) (0.494)  (0.068) (0.034) (0.066)  
Organized crime/Mafia 0.102 0.451 -0.156  0.193*** 0.245*** 0.240*** 11,646 
 (0.095) (0.408) (0.495)  (0.067) (0.033) (0.067)  
Anti-competitive practices of other producers 0.087 0.438 -0.127  0.192*** 0.239*** 0.242*** 11,643 
 (0.095) (0.410) (0.495)  (0.068) (0.033) (0.067)  
Contract violations of by customers/suppliers 0.101 0.442 -0.124  0.189*** 0.242*** 0.235*** 11,639 
 (0.097) (0.410) (0.495)  (0.068) (0.033) (0.067)  
Average score 0.091 0.445 -0.170  0.189*** 0.235*** 0.230*** 11,650 
 (0.095) (0.410) (0.491)  (0.068) (0.033) (0.067)  
Education of manager -0.166 -0.513 0.451  0.249*** 0.274*** 0.357*** 4,517 
 (0.152) (0.679) (0.845)  (0.097) (0.053) (0.114)  
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, / ,   0.109 -1.867** 3.201***  0.243 0.277*** 0.526*** 1,729 
 (0.203) (0.960) (1.179)  (0.160) (0.102) (0.158)  
log , / ,   0.077 0.550 -0.328  0.207*** 0.288*** 0.268*** 8,428 
 (0.104) (0.444) (0.547)  (0.079) (0.042) (0.080)  
Access to external finance 0.110 0.389 -0.068  0.192*** 0.249*** 0.214*** 11,123 
 (0.098) (0.405) (0.489)  (0.071) (0.035) (0.067)  
Cost of external finance 0.070 0.335 -0.001  0.208*** 0.245*** 0.233*** 11,211 
 (0.095) (0.401) (0.485)  (0.071) (0.034) (0.067)  
Quality of courts 0.088 0.513 -0.175  0.191*** 0.256*** 0.260*** 10,960 
 (0.098) (0.410) (0.496)  (0.069) (0.035) (0.070)  
Information about suppliers 0.151 0.375 -0.033  0.196*** 0.255*** 0.223*** 10,528 
 (0.098) (0.411) (0.505)  (0.075) (0.036) (0.071)  
Information about customers 0.137 -0.659 0.723  0.168* 0.210*** 0.171** 6,440 
 (0.108) (0.551) (0.611)  (0.100) (0.051) (0.089)  
Unofficial payments to public officials         
Own 0.052 0.178 0.314  0.197*** 0.244*** 0.246*** 10,234 
 (0.106) (0.417) (0.512)  (0.071) (0.036) (0.072)  
Other firms in the industry -0.044 0.492 0.065  0.217*** 0.239*** 0.225*** 9,642 
 (0.100) (0.433) (0.519)  (0.073) (0.037) (0.073)  
Reported for tax purposes         
Sales 0.127 0.434 -0.065  0.195*** 0.238*** 0.259*** 10,848 
 (0.095) (0.422) (0.520)  (0.074) (0.036) (0.068)  
Workforce 0.105 -0.781 0.607  0.169* 0.237*** 0.174** 6,830 
 (0.105) (0.579) (0.646)  (0.099) (0.047) (0.085)  
Wage bill 0.104 -0.860 0.683  0.149 0.233*** 0.172** 6,798 
 (0.106) (0.581) (0.646)  (0.098) (0.046) (0.084)  
Pressure for developing new products, from:         
Domestic competitors 0.078 0.384 -0.048  0.210*** 0.242*** 0.271*** 11,640 
 (0.093) (0.399) (0.483)  (0.068) (0.033) (0.067)  
Foreign competitors 0.090 0.490 -0.185  0.180*** 0.224*** 0.186*** 11,635 
 (0.095) (0.402) (0.487)  (0.067) (0.034) (0.067)  
Customers 0.068 0.416 -0.049  0.199*** 0.238*** 0.242*** 11,643 
 (0.093) (0.406) (0.491)  (0.068) (0.033) (0.066)  
Pressure for reducing costs, from:         
Domestic competitors 0.080 0.423 -0.089  0.193*** 0.242*** 0.253*** 11,647 
 (0.093) (0.403) (0.487)  (0.068) (0.033) (0.067)  
Foreign competitors 0.087 0.487 -0.173  0.183*** 0.227*** 0.192*** 11,643 
 (0.094) (0.404) (0.489)  (0.068) (0.034) (0.067)  
Customers 0.075 0.410 -0.069  0.196*** 0.239*** 0.233*** 11,648 
 (0.094) (0.406) (0.491)  (0.068) (0.033) (0.066)  
Lost         
Power 0.087 0.437 -0.083  0.183*** 0.247*** 0.240*** 11,435 
 (0.097) (0.411) (0.497)  (0.068) (0.034) (0.068)  
Water 0.103 0.469 -0.111  0.187*** 0.248*** 0.239*** 11,247 
 (0.096) (0.414) (0.504)  (0.068) (0.034) (0.068)  
Phone 0.103 0.458 -0.069  0.181*** 0.243*** 0.226*** 11,240 
 (0.095) (0.414) (0.502)  (0.069) (0.034) (0.067)  
Product 0.090 -0.627 0.479  0.152 0.238*** 0.164** 7,095 
 (0.101) (0.573) (0.631)  (0.097) (0.045) (0.081)  
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Table 8: New Technology; additional controls. 
Additional control Industry-level linkages  Firm-specific linkages Number of 









(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Problematic factors         
Telecommunications -0.047 0.364 -0.619  0.189*** 0.270*** 0.189*** 11,569 
 (0.109) (0.328) (0.415)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.064)  
Electricity -0.046 0.366 -0.621  0.189*** 0.274*** 0.186*** 11,569 
 (0.109) (0.328) (0.416)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.064)  
Transportation -0.047 0.357 -0.614  0.183*** 0.270*** 0.187*** 11,568 
 (0.108) (0.328) (0.415)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.065)  
Access to land -0.037 0.336 -0.612  0.188*** 0.272*** 0.190*** 11,561 
 (0.114) (0.329) (0.417)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.065)  
Title or leasing of land -0.038 0.313 -0.618  0.198*** 0.270*** 0.186*** 11,565 
 (0.113) (0.329) (0.418)  (0.065) (0.040) (0.064)  
Tax rates -0.042 0.311 -0.582  0.192*** 0.269*** 0.183*** 11,561 
 (0.112) (0.328) (0.415)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.064)  
Tax administration -0.033 0.308 -0.576  0.188*** 0.262*** 0.180*** 11,541 
 (0.115) (0.327) (0.415)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.065)  
Customs and trade regulations -0.026 0.318 -0.583  0.187*** 0.258*** 0.168*** 11,556 
 (0.116) (0.326) (0.415)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.064)  
Business licensing and permits -0.039 0.341 -0.643  0.191*** 0.267*** 0.181*** 11,564 
 (0.114) (0.329) (0.416)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.064)  
Labor regulations -0.041 0.360 -0.593  0.191*** 0.268*** 0.181*** 11,566 
 (0.111) (0.328) (0.416)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.064)  
Skills and education of available workers -0.041 0.314 -0.598  0.189*** 0.266*** 0.183*** 11,566 
 (0.111) (0.328) (0.417)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.065)  
Economic policy uncertainty -0.048 0.307 -0.580  0.191*** 0.267*** 0.180*** 11,564 
 (0.110) (0.329) (0.417)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.065)  
Macroeconomic instability -0.024 0.331 -0.610  0.191*** 0.267*** 0.182*** 11,560 
 (0.116) (0.329) (0.417)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.065)  
Functioning of the judiciary -0.040 0.349 -0.616  0.189*** 0.267*** 0.186*** 11,563 
 (0.112) (0.328) (0.415)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.065)  
Corruption -0.044 0.339 -0.607  0.190*** 0.269*** 0.186*** 11,555 
 (0.110) (0.327) (0.415)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.065)  
Street crime/theft/disorder -0.044 0.335 -0.590  0.190*** 0.272*** 0.184*** 11,550 
 (0.111) (0.327) (0.415)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.064)  
Organised crime/Mafia -0.043 0.322 -0.596  0.190*** 0.270*** 0.191*** 11,565 
 (0.110) (0.328) (0.415)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.064)  
Anti-competitive practices of other producers -0.050 0.316 -0.578  0.189*** 0.266*** 0.193*** 11,562 
 (0.109) (0.327) (0.414)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.064)  
Contract violations of by customers/suppliers -0.036 0.320 -0.582  0.191*** 0.268*** 0.188*** 11,558 
 (0.113) (0.326) (0.414)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.065)  
Average score -0.053 0.324 -0.617  0.188*** 0.260*** 0.182*** 11,569 
 (0.107) (0.328) (0.415)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.064)  
Education of manager -0.018 0.271 -0.040  0.223*** 0.223*** 0.224** 4,524 
 (0.154) (0.558) (0.740)  (0.092) (0.059) (0.114)  
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, / ,   0.367 2.390** -1.777  0.121 0.199* 0.516*** 1,726 
 (0.237) (1.044) (1.252)  (0.148) (0.113) (0.172)  
log , / ,   0.043 0.182 -0.469  0.148* 0.265*** 0.217*** 8,379 
 (0.105) (0.404) (0.502)  (0.079) (0.050) (0.075)  
Access to external finance -0.061 0.304 -0.518  0.177*** 0.268*** 0.184*** 11,055 
 (0.114) (0.330) (0.421)  (0.067) (0.041) (0.064)  
Cost of external finance -0.052 0.308 -0.577  0.175*** 0.265*** 0.181*** 11,140 
 (0.110) (0.333) (0.423)  (0.066) (0.041) (0.065)  
Quality of courts -0.029 0.302 -0.608  0.230*** 0.270*** 0.195*** 10,889 
 (0.113) (0.337) (0.424)  (0.069) (0.042) (0.067)  
Information about suppliers 0.012 0.338 -0.581  0.197*** 0.285*** 0.216*** 10,454 
 (0.116) (0.349) (0.432)  (0.067) (0.041) (0.067)  
Information about customers -0.040 0.289 0.340  0.210** 0.302*** 0.207*** 6,365 
 (0.136) (0.786) (0.773)  (0.095) (0.055) (0.077)  
Unofficial payments to public officials         
Own -0.110 0.127 -0.335  0.169*** 0.278*** 0.188*** 10,175 
 (0.114) (0.341) (0.430)  (0.069) (0.043) (0.070)  
Other firms in the industry -0.212** 0.212 -0.301  0.211*** 0.283*** 0.200*** 9,581 
 (0.105) (0.346) (0.441)  (0.070) (0.047) (0.071)  
Reported for tax purposes         
Sales -0.032 0.325 -0.478  0.180*** 0.279*** 0.212*** 10,770 
 (0.109) (0.338) (0.435)  (0.067) (0.042) (0.066)  
Workforce -0.030 0.584 -0.108  0.171* 0.304*** 0.203*** 6,749 
 (0.132) (0.739) (0.727)  (0.095) (0.056) (0.078)  
Wage bill -0.019 0.402 0.091  0.154* 0.300*** 0.199*** 6,718 
 (0.133) (0.753) (0.749)  (0.093) (0.056) (0.078)  
Pressure for developing new products, from:         
Domestic competitors -0.046 0.304 -0.555  0.195*** 0.270*** 0.192*** 11,559 
 (0.108) (0.330) (0.420)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.065)  
Foreign competitors -0.038 0.372 -0.655  0.179*** 0.249*** 0.139** 11,554 
 (0.109) (0.329) (0.419)  (0.065) (0.042) (0.065)  
Customers -0.057 0.293 -0.535  0.191*** 0.267*** 0.190*** 11,562 
 (0.106) (0.329) (0.417)  (0.064) (0.041) (0.065)  
Pressure for reducing costs, from:         
Domestic competitors -0.053 0.335 -0.571  0.192*** 0.271*** 0.198*** 11,566 
 (0.107) (0.329) (0.418)  (0.065) (0.040) (0.065)  
Foreign competitors -0.045 0.381 -0.643  0.178*** 0.248*** 0.139** 11,562 
 (0.108) (0.329) (0.417)  (0.065) (0.042) (0.065)  
Customers -0.061 0.314 -0.556  0.193*** 0.266*** 0.183*** 11,567 
 (0.107) (0.331) (0.418)  (0.065) (0.040) (0.064)  
Lost         
Power -0.052 0.402 -0.628  0.186*** 0.280*** 0.203*** 11,354 
 (0.109) (0.331) (0.417)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.065)  
Water -0.046 0.492 -0.710*  0.182*** 0.276*** 0.205*** 11,166 
 (0.106) (0.329) (0.417)  (0.066) (0.042) (0.066)  
Phone -0.049 0.489 -0.704*  0.181*** 0.279*** 0.199*** 11,159 
 (0.108) (0.326) (0.411)  (0.066) (0.042) (0.065)  
Product -0.031 0.652 -0.129  0.173* 0.302*** 0.194*** 7,011 









Table A1: Definition of Variables 
Variable Name Variable Definition BEEPS question 
Newproduct New product or upgrade 
existing product 
Dummy variable. Has your company undertaken any of the following initiatives over 
the last 36 months? Dummy variable is equal to one if ‘yes’ to any of the two 
questions: 
- Developed successfully a major new product line 
- Upgraded an existing product line 
Newtech New technology is 
implemented 
Dummy variable = 1 if answer is affirmative to question: Has your firm acquired new
production technology over the last 36 months? 
SMNE Share of sales to MNEs Share of sales to multinationals located in your country (not including your parent 
company, if applicable) 
EXPORT Export share Share of sales exported directly or indirectly through a distributor 
IMPORT Import share Share of your firm’s material inputs and supplies that are imported directly or 
indirectly through a distributor 
L Labor Number of permanent and temporary employees 36 month ago 
CU Capacity utilization Level of utilization of facilities/man power relative to the maximum output possible 
using its facilities/man power at the time 
SKILL Share of skilled workers, 3 
yrs ago 
What share of your current permanent, full-time workers were skilled workers 36 
months ago? 
EDU Share of workers with higher 
education, 3yrs ago 
What share of the workforce at your firm had some university education 36 months 
ago? 
Age Log (Firm’s age ) Year of survey minus the year when the firm was established (minimum age is two 
years). For the year established: In what year did your firm begin operations in this 
country? 
SOE State owned Government is the major shareholder (50%+) 
CNM Compete in national markets  Does your firm compete in the national market (i.e. whole country) for its main 
product line or service or does it serve primarily the local market (i.e. region, city, or 
neighborhood)? Yes = 1 
LOC Location Type of location: Capital; Other city over 1 million; Other 250,000-1,000,000; Other  
50,000-250,000; Under 50,000 
Markup Markup Considering your main product line or main line of services in the domestic market, 
by what margin does your sales price exceed your operating costs (i.e., the cost of 






Sample Industry-level linkages  Firm-level linkages Number of 









(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
All Firms 0.099 -0.012 0.323  0.191*** 0.246*** 0.237*** 11,651 
 (0.094) (0.214) (0.196)  (0.067) (0.034) (0.066)  
Manufacturing 0.131 -0.305 0.661***  0.068 0.262*** 0.217*** 3,915 
 (0.140) (0.257) (0.247)  (0.106) (0.062) (0.089)  
Services 0.061 0.106 0.144  0.307*** 0.203*** 0.248** 6,299 
 (0.137) (0.398) (0.436)  (0.098) (0.041) (0.109)  
New firms 0.051 -0.064 0.358  0.147* 0.175*** 0.187*** 8,539 
 (0.105) (0.237) (0.242)  (0.081) (0.039) (0.078)  
Old firms 0.187 -0.052 0.347  0.304*** 0.442*** 0.351*** 3,110 
 (0.184) (0.329) (0.332)  (0.115) (0.082) (0.116)  
De-novo firms 0.107 -0.222 0.539**  0.104 0.161*** 0.267*** 6,341 
 (0.118) (0.244) (0.259)  (0.099) (0.046) (0.104)  
Labor size: 2-10 employees -0.051 0.015 0.564*  0.178 0.251*** 0.511*** 4,684 
 (0.126) (0.284) (0.304)  (0.142) (0.054) (0.142)  
Labor size: 11-49 employees 0.181 -0.251 0.122  0.127 0.268*** 0.210* 3,498 
 (0.178) (0.290) (0.319)  (0.109) (0.071) (0.120)  
Labor size: 50-100 employees -0.215 0.038 0.334  0.288 -0.011 0.222 1,204 
 (0.233) (0.499) (0.516)  (0.186) (0.121) (0.178)  
Labor size: 100+ employees 0.410*** 0.010 0.404  0.285*** 0.340*** 0.185 2,252 
 (0.149) (0.411) (0.404)  (0.117) (0.088) (0.121)  
State owned only -0.156 -0.434 0.945*  0.462** 0.285** 0.416* 1,205 
 (0.230) (0.545) (0.529)  (0.205) (0.136) (0.238)  
Foreign owned only -0.111 0.187 -0.232  0.118 0.220*** 0.227* 1,491 
 (0.246) (0.465) (0.449)  (0.144) (0.091) (0.127)  
Priv. domestic owned only 0.186* 0.024 0.326  0.173** 0.252*** 0.246*** 8,971 
 (0.102) (0.211) (0.212)  (0.089) (0.039) (0.081)  
Time spent with officials: low 0.094 0.033 -0.002  0.158 0.214*** 0.202* 4,311 
 (0.166) (0.396) (0.417)  (0.111) (0.057) (0.111)  
Time spent with officials: med 0.020 0.390 0.233  0.096 0.237*** 0.263*** 3,791 
 (0.127) (0.272) (0.307)  (0.111) (0.062) (0.098)  
Time spent with officials: high 0.051 0.116 0.443  0.390*** 0.227*** 0.335*** 2,836 
 (0.159) (0.407) (0.350)  (0.134) (0.070) (0.129)  
CIS 0.329* 0.444 -0.227  0.109 0.312*** 0.046 3,870 
 (0.181) (0.327) (0.378)  (0.145) (0.063) (0.136)  
EU 0.039 -0.353 0.967***  0.263*** 0.163*** 0.244*** 4,411 
 (0.151) (0.422) (0.377)  (0.100) (0.051) (0.095)  
SEE -0.474* -0.094 0.441  0.061 0.245*** 0.376*** 2,388 










Sample Industry-level linkages  Firm-level linkages Number of 









(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
All Firms -0.064 0.090 -0.183  0.190*** 0.271*** 0.187*** 11,570 
 (0.110) (0.198) (0.216)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.065)  
Manufacturing 0.147 -0.007 0.014  0.182* 0.253*** 0.211*** 3,888 
 (0.195) (0.325) (0.298)  (0.099) (0.075) (0.088)  
Services -0.067 0.048 -0.234  0.185** 0.256*** 0.181* 6,260 
 (0.134) (0.380) (0.410)  (0.090) (0.051) (0.100)  
New firms 0.003 0.068 -0.373  0.072 0.225*** 0.194*** 8,474 
 (0.112) (0.240) (0.282)  (0.077) (0.046) (0.079)  
Old firms -0.236 0.185 0.231  0.460*** 0.387*** 0.221* 3,096 
 (0.196) (0.313) (0.313)  (0.114) (0.079) (0.117)  
De-novo firms 0.026 -0.252 0.008  0.052 0.181*** 0.174* 6,294 
 (0.124) (0.237) (0.307)  (0.095) (0.053) (0.100)  
Labor size: 2-10 employees 0.094 0.102 -0.171  0.231* 0.243*** 0.255 4,658 
 (0.142) (0.382) (0.402)  (0.130) (0.056) (0.174)  
Labor size: 11-49 employees 0.022 -0.212 -0.132  -0.089 0.221*** 0.372*** 3,482 
 (0.191) (0.267) (0.339)  (0.120) (0.079) (0.118)  
Labor size: 50-100 employees -0.193 -0.085 0.690  0.375** 0.231* 0.199 1,188 
 (0.233) (0.473) (0.504)  (0.171) (0.135) (0.161)  
Labor size: 100+ employees -0.166 0.249 -0.322  0.410*** 0.435*** 0.162 2,234 
 (0.169) (0.357) (0.349)  (0.132) (0.092) (0.110)  
State owned only -0.298 0.519 -0.515  0.427** 0.587*** 0.170 1,200 
 (0.215) (0.523) (0.527)  (0.201) (0.134) (0.223)  
Foreign owned only -0.233 0.006 -0.638  0.084 0.368*** 0.162 1,472 
 (0.225) (0.384) (0.412)  (0.140) (0.110) (0.130)  
Priv. domestic owned only 0.075 0.095 -0.127  0.234*** 0.224*** 0.262*** 8,917 
 (0.116) (0.218) (0.252)  (0.079) (0.047) (0.082)  
Time spent with officials: low -0.169 0.397 -0.623*  0.249** 0.214*** 0.277** 4,272 
 (0.160) (0.284) (0.332)  (0.117) (0.067) (0.127)  
Time spent with officials: med 0.030 0.074 0.180  0.134 0.370*** 0.218** 3,771 
 (0.147) (0.306) (0.351)  (0.115) (0.065) (0.112)  
Time spent with officials: high -0.160 0.441 -0.666*  0.171 0.252*** 0.136 2,815 
 (0.165) (0.370) (0.390)  (0.130) (0.080) (0.143)  
CIS -0.403** 1.190*** -0.999***  0.024 0.369*** 0.201 3,848 
 (0.176) (0.269) (0.381)  (0.134) (0.069) (0.122)  
EU -0.161 -0.051 -0.123  0.283*** 0.191*** 0.040 4,384 
 (0.150) (0.359) (0.397)  (0.100) (0.062) (0.098)  
SEE -0.777*** -0.458 0.831  0.135 0.250*** 0.336*** 2,379 




Sample Industry-level linkages  Firm-level linkages Number of 









Horizontal Backward Forward  Horizontal Backward Forward  
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) 
All Firms -0.089 -0.524 0.745***  0.258** 0.240 0.172  0.191*** 0.244*** 0.236*** 11,651 
 (0.140) (0.365) (0.286)  (0.115) (0.251) (0.250)  (0.067) (0.034) (0.066)  
Manufacturing 0.007 -0.821* 0.990***  0.192 -0.083 0.553*  0.068 0.260*** 0.216*** 3,915 
 (0.203) (0.459) (0.349)  (0.161) (0.313) (0.326)  (0.106) (0.062) (0.089)  
Services -0.301 -0.025 0.512  0.324** 0.335 -0.164  0.304*** 0.201*** 0.255*** 6,299 
 (0.214) (0.660) (0.608)  (0.164) (0.466) (0.552)  (0.098) (0.041) (0.108)  
New firms -0.212 -0.451 0.773**  0.239* 0.150 0.188  0.146* 0.175*** 0.189*** 8,539 
 (0.180) (0.486) (0.362)  (0.130) (0.283) (0.304)  (0.081) (0.039) (0.077)  
Old firms 0.152 -0.984 0.842  0.301 0.359 0.192  0.304*** 0.437*** 0.346*** 3,110 
 (0.244) (0.640) (0.543)  (0.237) (0.414) (0.483)  (0.115) (0.082) (0.116)  
De-novo firms -0.026 -0.644 0.870**  0.222 -0.024 0.432  0.104 0.160*** 0.265*** 6,341 
 (0.200) (0.601) (0.422)  (0.150) (0.301) (0.329)  (0.099) (0.046) (0.103)  
Labor size: 2-10 employees -0.301 -0.221 0.612  0.139 0.216 0.698*  0.174 0.253*** 0.510*** 4,684 
 (0.190) (0.589) (0.445)  (0.149) (0.312) (0.401)  (0.142) (0.054) (0.143)  
Labor size: 11-49 employees -0.013 -1.516*** 0.688  0.434* 0.359 0.130  0.129 0.270*** 0.207* 3,498 
 (0.253) (0.589) (0.509)  (0.251) (0.364) (0.420)  (0.109) (0.071) (0.120)  
Labor size: 50-100 employees -0.468 0.182 1.069  -0.152 -0.114 -0.274  0.285 -0.019 0.212 1,204 
 (0.402) (0.837) (0.821)  (0.297) (0.640) (0.660)  (0.186) (0.122) (0.178)  
Labor size: 100+ employees 0.103 -0.280 1.226**  0.614*** 0.171 -0.254  0.280*** 0.333*** 0.188 2,252 
 (0.251) (0.647) (0.542)  (0.185) (0.493) (0.588)  (0.117) (0.088) (0.121)  
State owned only -0.179 -0.811 1.835**  -0.163 -0.196 -0.033  0.449** 0.280** 0.426* 1,205 
 (0.369) (1.007) (0.833)  (0.289) (0.726) (0.811)  (0.206) (0.137) (0.240)  
Foreign owned only -0.468 0.042 -0.358  0.136 0.408 0.060  0.125 0.212** 0.237* 1,491 
 (0.321) (0.868) (0.749)  (0.313) (0.533) (0.672)  (0.144) (0.092) (0.126)  
Priv. domestic owned only -0.073 -0.575 0.839***  0.386*** 0.312 0.144  0.167* 0.251*** 0.243*** 8,971 
 (0.162) (0.458) (0.347)  (0.126) (0.232) (0.259)  (0.089) (0.039) (0.081)  
Time spent with officials: low 0.065 -0.887 0.562  0.189 0.428 -0.149  0.160 0.215*** 0.200* 4,311 
 (0.283) (0.615) (0.569)  (0.195) (0.446) (0.520)  (0.111) (0.057) (0.111)  
Time spent with officials: med -0.124 -0.361 1.072***  0.158 0.642** -0.221  0.097 0.232*** 0.260*** 3,791 
 (0.219) (0.548) (0.460)  (0.161) (0.327) (0.442)  (0.112) (0.062) (0.098)  
Time spent with officials: high -0.224 -0.266 0.345  0.371* 0.416 0.797  0.384*** 0.227*** 0.331*** 2,836 
 (0.249) (0.565) (0.523)  (0.219) (0.545) (0.486)  (0.135) (0.070) (0.129)  
CIS 0.175 -0.344 0.389  0.663*** 1.234*** -0.932  0.114 0.314*** 0.045 3,870 
 (0.236) (0.564) (0.415)  (0.223) (0.494) (0.843)  (0.145) (0.063) (0.132)  
EU -0.139 0.492 1.014**  0.163 -0.734* 0.701*  0.254*** 0.168*** 0.244*** 4,411 
 (0.168) (0.552) (0.456)  (0.199) (0.435) (0.413)  (0.100) (0.051) (0.095)  
SEE -0.470 -1.490* 0.735  -0.457 2.309* -0.034  0.074 0.244*** 0.365*** 2,388 
 (0.362) (0.856) (0.774)  (0.437) (1.219) (0.713)  (0.146) (0.076) (0.151)  
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Table A5: New Technology – OECD vs. non‐OECD foreign presence (direct linkages) 
Sample Industry-level linkages  Firm-level linkages Number of 









Horizontal Backward Forward  Horizontal Backward Forward  
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) 
All Firms -0.385*** 0.350 -0.670**  0.137 0.128 0.350  0.186*** 0.270*** 0.195*** 11,570 
 (0.133) (0.341) (0.326)  (0.134) (0.242) (0.319)  (0.065) (0.041) (0.065)  
Manufacturing -0.200 1.124** -1.037***  0.325 -0.512 0.860*  0.170* 0.260*** 0.225*** 3,888 
 (0.258) (0.498) (0.378)  (0.216) (0.404) (0.457)  (0.100) (0.076) (0.087)  
Services -0.598*** 0.060 -0.475  0.292 0.367 0.244  0.179** 0.249*** 0.196** 6,260 
 (0.156) (0.690) (0.682)  (0.190) (0.435) (0.609)  (0.090) (0.052) (0.100)  
New firms -0.300* 0.446 -0.839**  0.175 0.047 0.055  0.067 0.225*** 0.204*** 8,474 
 (0.169) (0.431) (0.415)  (0.137) (0.281) (0.392)  (0.077) (0.046) (0.079)  
Old firms -0.590** 0.243 -0.322  0.022 0.308 0.998**  0.455*** 0.378*** 0.228** 3,096 
 (0.270) (0.624) (0.528)  (0.245) (0.407) (0.450)  (0.114) (0.079) (0.117)  
De-novo firms -0.208 0.284 -0.500  0.134 -0.370 0.372  0.047 0.182*** 0.181* 6,294 
 (0.209) (0.473) (0.471)  (0.149) (0.288) (0.440)  (0.095) (0.053) (0.100)  
Labor size: 2-10 employees -0.108 0.502 -0.586  0.206 0.030 0.142  0.228* 0.244*** 0.259 4,658 
 (0.206) (0.697) (0.634)  (0.191) (0.462) (0.548)  (0.130) (0.057) (0.176)  
Labor size: 11-49 employees -0.581** 0.426 -1.076**  0.393* -0.243 0.847*  -0.090 0.226*** 0.393*** 3,482 
 (0.261) (0.592) (0.549)  (0.230) (0.314) (0.483)  (0.120) (0.078) (0.119)  
Labor size: 50-100 employees -0.758 0.019 1.089  0.051 -0.058 0.494  0.372** 0.215 0.207 1,188 
 (0.488) (0.925) (0.848)  (0.291) (0.601) (0.649)  (0.170) (0.136) (0.160)  
Labor size: 100+ employees -0.370 -0.514 -0.126  0.041 0.696 -0.092  0.418*** 0.427*** 0.158 2,234 
 (0.260) (0.603) (0.522)  (0.239) (0.458) (0.526)  (0.133) (0.092) (0.112)  
State owned only -0.554* -0.058 -1.198  0.070 0.872 1.045  0.452** 0.588*** 0.128 1,200 
 (0.335) (0.917) (0.793)  (0.291) (0.664) (0.751)  (0.203) (0.136) (0.227)  
Foreign owned only -0.760*** 1.545** -1.721***  0.025 -0.398 -0.151  0.073 0.361*** 0.184 1,472 
 (0.312) (0.711) (0.664)  (0.270) (0.467) (0.599)  (0.143) (0.110) (0.130)  
Priv. domestic owned only -0.323** 0.402 -0.472  0.293** 0.101 0.246  0.226*** 0.224*** 0.270*** 8,917 
 (0.167) (0.424) (0.424)  (0.137) (0.263) (0.352)  (0.079) (0.047) (0.082)  
Time spent with officials: low -0.364 1.081* -1.277***  -0.066 0.157 -0.108  0.244** 0.211*** 0.287** 4,272 
 (0.276) (0.591) (0.547)  (0.185) (0.377) (0.493)  (0.117) (0.067) (0.126)  
Time spent with officials: med -0.547** -0.583 0.874  0.408** 0.429 0.037  0.135 0.359*** 0.225** 3,771 
 (0.249) (0.676) (0.665)  (0.177) (0.379) (0.466)  (0.115) (0.065) (0.113)  
Time spent with officials: high -0.182 0.826 -1.661***  -0.150 0.158 0.556  0.172 0.255*** 0.132 2,815 
 (0.221) (0.577) (0.557)  (0.225) (0.490) (0.630)  (0.130) (0.080) (0.143)  
CIS -0.262 1.229*** -1.122**  -0.674** 1.065** -0.745  0.023 0.369*** 0.197 3,848 
 (0.189) (0.463) (0.498)  (0.313) (0.495) (0.922)  (0.135) (0.069) (0.122)  
EU -0.381* 0.034 -0.690  -0.004 -0.030 0.372  0.279*** 0.191*** 0.044 4,384 
 (0.221) (0.566) (0.525)  (0.213) (0.427) (0.489)  (0.099) (0.063) (0.099)  
SEE -1.205*** -0.978 1.014  -0.192 0.230 1.029  0.145 0.246*** 0.335*** 2,379 
 (0.338) (0.807) (0.711)  (0.367) (1.326) (0.817)  (0.129) (0.091) (0.141)  
 
